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Summary: This paper presents a broad review of the determinants of childbearing with a special focus on Germany. Fer-
tility decline, cross-country differences, and the gap between desired and realized fertility are addressed by discussing
the evidence related to four theoretical arguments: change in values, family policy, economic theory on fertility, and
preference theory. Each of the theories reviewed provides a partial explanation of the low fertility puzzle, but none of
the theories alone is able to fully explain low fertility. The paper closes with the argument that more attention needs to
be paid to the effect size of the different variables, women’s preferences, and interdisciplinary research.
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Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel gibt einen breiten Überblick über die Determinanten von Geburtenraten und legt da-
bei den Schwerpunkt auf Deutschland. Auf der Grundlage von vier Theoriesträngen (Wertewandel, Familienpolitik,
çkomische Fertilitätstheorie, Präferenz-Theorie) werden die folgenden Phänomene untersucht: Geburtenrückgang, län-
derspezifische Unterschiede und die Diskrepanz zwischen angestrebter und tatsächlicher Geburtenanzahl. Alle vier ver-
wendeten Theorien bieten eine Teilerklärung für das Phänomen niedriger Geburtenzahlen, jedoch ist keine der Theorien
in der Lage, eine alleinige Explikation zu liefern. Der Aufsatz schließt mit der Aufforderung, mehr Aufmerksamkeit auf
die tatsächliche Grçße der unterschiedlichen Variablen, die Präferenz der Frauen und interdisziplinäre Forschung zu
legen.
Schlagworte: Geburtenrate; Deutschland; Ökonomische Theorie; Familienpolitik; Werte; Präferenzen; Effektstärke.
1 Introduction
Since the 1960s, the second demographic transition
has swept over the Western countries, and changes
in family formation, such as postponement of
births and marriage, decline in the total first mar-
riage rate, and increase of divorces/union dissolu-
tions, cohabitation and extra-marital births have
taken place. Moreover, total period fertility rates
(TFR) have declined and in many cases stabilized
below the replacement level of 2.1 whereas life ex-
pectancy has increased considerably. The future
ageing and decline of natural populations has in
turn translated to increases in the demand for for-
eign labor, i. e. immigration (van de Kaa 2002).
Population ageing presents challenges for the wel-
fare state budgets (Meier & Werding 2010), and
the difficulties might be intensified because of the
ageing of the median voter. On the other hand,
Kaufmann (2005) argues that population decline
(not population ageing) is the most important de-
mographic problem, as it leads to a Schrumpfende
Gesellschaft (a shrinking society). Conversely, Hon-
drich (2007) claims that qualitative changes (e. g.
increases in productivity, the possibility of the pa-
rents to devote more time to children when families
are smaller) will compensate for the decreases in
quantity of the people and concludes that Weniger
sind mehr (less is more).
The challenges will be particularly large in Ger-
many. According to the UN’s (2012) population
prognosis (constant fertility variant), the German
old age dependency ratio will increase from 32 in
2010 to 63 in 2050. Population growth in turn will
remain negative from 2005–2010 throughout the
century. One of the many ways to deal with these
developments is to increase fertility, and in this re-
spect the government has already taken action: Ac-
cording to Henninger et al. (2008) the desire to in-
crease fertility is one of the reasons for the 2007
reform of parental benefits. However, although the
idea that policies influence fertility is appealing to
decision makers, reasons for low fertility remain a
matter of debate and the lessons politicians can
learn from the research are limited. Indeed, despite
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decades of investigations, the research on the rea-
sons for low fertility is still, to borrow the expres-
sion from Thomas Kuhn (1970), in a pre-paradigm
phase.
The purpose of this paper is to add to the existing
review articles of the low fertility literature (van de
Kaa 1996; Caldwell & Schindlmayr 2003; Morgan
& Taylor 2006; Balbo et al. 2013) by focusing on
the situation in Germany. After this introduction,
the dependent variable problem will be briefly ex-
plained, followed by a description of low fertility in
Germany. Thereafter four different families of theo-
ries on low fertility (economic theory on fertility,
value change theory, theories emphasizing the role
of family policies and preference theory) will be dis-
cussed. In the final section some avenues for future
research are suggested.
The concentration on four different types of theo-
ries is naturally bound to exclude many interesting
ideas, such as, e. g., the theories on the value of
children (Hoffman & Hoffman 1973; Nauck
2007), the low-fertility trap (Lutz & Skirbekk
2005), or the discussion on the role of contracep-
tives (e. g. Leridon 2006). However, in order to pro-
vide a meaningful review it was, given the vast
amount of literature, necessary to focus on only a
few theories. The decision to include these theories
was based on the amount of studies that have been
inspired by these theories as well as the fruitfulness
of the theories in empirical research. The preference
theory was selected as a potentially important new-
comer.
In the following review, the theories are organized
chronologically starting from the 1960s (the eco-
nomic theory), and continuing with the value
change theory which has its roots in the 1970s and
1980s. Thereafter the theories on the role of family
policy, which have dominated the research from the
1990s, are discussed. Finally, I take a look at the
preference theory, which has been on the agenda to
an increasing extent during the past 10-15 years.
For each theory the arguments and empirical evi-
dence are reviewed. Moreover, I discuss if and how
each theory helps us to understand low fertility in
Germany when it comes to time trends, differences
in comparison to other countries, as well as the gap
between desired and realized fertility.
2 The dependent variable problem
Low fertility can be defined at least in five different
ways: low in comparison to the replacement level,
to past fertility, other countries, other regions, or
desired fertility. The situation is further compli-
cated by the fact that many of the above aspects
can be studied both from period and cohort per-
spectives, and at micro and macro levels. In addi-
tion to the problems with conceptualization it is un-
clear which indicators should be employed as
dependent variables. It is possible to measure, for
example, total fertility, birth order specific levels,
or parity progression ratios. The problems are par-
ticularly large when it comes to macro-level period
fertility, and several authors have questioned the
use of the most frequently employed measure, the
total fertility rate (TFR). The criticism has two
roots (N Bhrolchin 1992, 2011; Sobotka & Lutz
2010): (1) As the TFR is not standardized for the
parity and interval between the births, it measures
not only the current but also past fertility. (2) As
the TFR is influenced by the changes in the timing
of fertility, it measures both the tempo and quan-
tum of fertility. However, despite these serious
weaknesses the TFR is still widely used, most prob-
ably because the availability of better standardized
measures such as those discussed by Park (1976),
Feeney & Yu (1987), N Bhrolchin (1987) and
Rallu & Toulemon (1994) has been scarce (the re-
cently launched Human Fertility Database is an im-
portant development in this respect). Data avail-
ability is also a problem for the many tempo-
adjustment methods which aim to remove the
tempo-effect (Bongaarts & Feeney 1998; Kohler &
Philipov 2001; Kohler & Ortega 2002). In addi-
tion, it still remains somewhat unclear how tempo-
adjusted measures should be interpreted and for
what purposes they should be used (Van Imhoff
2001; N Bhrolchin 2011).
3 Fertility in Germany
The below description of fertility trends in Ger-
many aims to provide some background on the
German situation. For a more detailed review of
German fertility the reader is advised to consult
Dorbritz (2008) and Goldstein & Kreyenfeld
(2011). For the considerable regional differences
within the western parts of Germany, Hank (2001,
2002) is recommended.
3.1 Period and cohort total fertility
Together with the other developed countries, Ger-
many experienced a fertility decline after the baby
boom which followed WWII. Whereas in many
countries (Anglo-Saxon and Northern European
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countries, France, Belgium and the Netherlands)
the fertility rates stabilized at relatively high levels
(at or above 1.7.), in German speaking countries,
South Europe, and East Europe after 1990, the
TFR has been below 1.5 (see Table 4).
Taking a closer look at the German trends (Figure
1), both in East and West Germany the baby boom
peaked at 2.5 in the mid-1960s, after which the
TFR decreased towards 1.5 in the mid-1970s.
Thereafter the TFR in western Germany has fluc-
tuated between 1.3–1.5. In East Germany, the TFR
increased to 1.9 in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
only to decline to 1.5 in 1990. Further, after the
reunification, the eastern German TFR suddenly
decreased to 0.8. The “birth shock” (Eberstadt
1994) however was temporary, and the fertility in
eastern Germany has now converged to western
German levels.
The story is slightly different if it is told from the
cohort perspective: In western Germany the fertility
decline has been continuous throughout the cohorts
(from 1.9 to 1.5), in the eastern part the fertility
rates were at 1.8–1.9 for the cohorts born in 1940–
1960, but for the cohorts born in the 1960s the
CFR declined from 1.8 to 1.5 (Human Fertility Da-
tabase 20131).
In public discourse (e. g. Sarrazin 2011), the low
fertility of the native population is sometimes con-
trasted with the high fertility of the immigrant
population and coupled with claims according to
which immigrants sooner or later will become a
majority. Such claims are not supported by the
data: The first and second generation immigrants
usually have higher fertility than the native popula-
tion but show nevertheless a clear adaptation to
the local fertility patterns (Milewski 2010; Sobotka
2008a).
3.2 Fertility timing
As discussed above, one explanation to low TFR is
the postponement2 of childbearing, which can be
observed in all developed countries in so far as the
mean age of the mother at birth (MAB) has in-
creased, the number of births at younger ages de-
clined, and the number of births at older ages in-
creased (Frejka & Calot 2001; Billari & Kohler
2004; Frejka & Sardon 2006, 2007; Billari et al.
2007). As for Germany, in the western parts the
MAB has increased from 26.7 in 1974 to 30.5 years
of age in 2010. In eastern Germany, the MAB has
been lower, and it was not until the reunification
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Source: Human Fertility Database (2013)
Fig. 1 TFR, 1956–2010
1 In all data from this source, Berlin is excluded from
1990 onwards.
2 According to N Bhrolchin & Toulemon (2005) the
term is used in a variety of ways and can be understood ei-
ther as an individual level behavior (potential parents de-
lay the births, actively or passively, with the idea of having
children at later ages) or as a macro level statistical feature
(declines in fertility at younger ages are followed by an in-
crease in fertility at older ages).
that the MAB rapidly increased, from 25.1 in 1990
to 29.3 in 2010 (Human Fertility Database 2013).
As there are cross-country differences in the pace of
postponement, postponement is a partial reason for
fertility differences between countries. Sobotka
(2004: 206) for example found that the regional
differences in period fertility between Northern and
Southern Europe decrease by one quarter when the
postponement effect is taken into account. As for
Germany (Table 2), the tempo-adjusted TFR
(adjTFR)3 has in general been higher than the TFR,
i. e., part of the low period fertility can be simply
explained with the postponement. Further, even
though there are no estimates on the adjTFR for
eastern Germany for the 1990s when the increase
of the eastern German MAB took place, the fact
that the adjTFR for eastern Germany in 1997 was
1.47 in comparison to the conventional TFR at
1.05 indicates that the tempo-effect has been con-
siderable.
Finally, it is important to remember that postpone-
ment might negatively influence cohort fertility:
The later childbearing begins, the fewer years a
woman has to give birth to additional children.
Also, at older ages the possibility to have children
declines due to physiological constraints (Billari et
al. 2007: 155ff.). Micro-level findings show that
low age at first birth increases the chance of having
a second child (for Austria, see Prskawetz & Zaga-
glia 2005; for France see Kçppen 2006; for Den-
mark, see Gerster et al. 2007). Such findings do
not, however, necessarily support the conclusion
that postponement influences the total number of
children; it is also possible that the women who
have their first child at a higher age are a selective
group and originally planned to have only one
child.
3.3 Fertility by birth order
In addition to the total fertility, it is important to
study birth order specific fertility rates. For in-
stance, the decline in period fertility in Europe from
the 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s can be ex-
plained by a decline in third and higher order
births, followed by a postponement of first and sec-
ond order births, which lead to a decrease in the
first and second birth rates (Bosveld 1996). Further-
more, cohort studies give evidence about increases
in childlessness (Frejka & Sardon 2006; Breton &
Prioux 2009). The amount of one-child families in
turn shows stability in some countries (Austria,
Sweden) whereas in other countries the number of
one child families is decreasing (Germany, England
and Wales, Finland, France, Denmark), and in
others increasing (the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Italy, Greece) (Breton & Prioux 2009).
In Germany, only the marital birth order was regis-
tered until recently (Luy & Pçtzsch 2010: 607),
and there are only estimates on the birth-order spe-
cific TFRs and CFRs (Table 3). As can be read from
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Table 1 adjTFR and TFR in eastern and western Ger-
many, 1960–2005
Eastern Germany Western Germany
adjTFR TFR adjTFR TFR
1960 2.18 2.35 2.18 2.37
1965 2.35 2.49 2.33 2.51
1970 2.23 2.19 2.03 1.99
1975 1.59 1.54 1.61 1.45
1980 1.83 1.94 1.60 1.45
1985 1.81 1.74 1.57 1.28
1990 – 1.51 1.47 1.46
1995 – 0.84 1.52 1.34
2000 1.53 1.24 1.54 1.42
2005 1.53 1.30 1.61 1.36
Source: For TFR, Human Fertility Database (2013). For adjTFR
(three-year averages), Luy & Pçtzsch (2010: 620).
Table 2 Period and cohort fertility rates by birth order
Period fertility rate by birth order (average over 2001–2008)
Germany East Germany West
TFR1 0.68 0.67
TFR2 0.42 0.47
TFR3 0.12 0.16
TFR4+ 0.06 0.07
TFR 1.27 1.37
Cohort fertility rates by birth order, Cohort 1955
Germany East Germany West (at age 40)
CFR1 0.92 0.81
CFR2 0.66 0.53
CFR3 0.18 0.18
CFR4+ 0.08 0.10
CFR 1.84 1.62
Source: For period TFR, author’s calculations based on Table 3 in
Kreyenfeld et al. (2010: 213). For cohort fertility rate, Kreyenfeld
(2003: 308).
3 As the German register data does not enable the calcula-
tion of tempo-adjusted rates it is necessary to rely on esti-
mates (Luy & Pçtzsch 2010; Goldstein & Kreyenfeld
2011).
the table, childlessness was more common in West
Germany, but the CFR3 and CFR4+ were relatively
similar, which indicates that in West Germany a
larger share of women progressed to higher parities
(see also Goldstein & Kreyenfeld 2011). The TFR2
and TFR3 in turn are higher in western Germany,
which also explains the East-West differences in pe-
riod fertility. The TFR1 is exceptionally low in
both parts of the country.
3.4 Desired and realized fertility
The results from the Eurobarometer in 2001 and
2006 show that the ideal average family size in the
EU-15 countries is still at or above 2.0, that is,
above the realized fertility. The only exceptions are
Austria and Germany, where below replacement
fertility ideals have been observed (Goldstein et al.
2003). In Germany the mean ideal family size had
again increased to above 2.0 in the Eurobarometer
2006, which suggests that subreplacement fertility
ideals were temporary (Table 3).4 Notice, however,
that the relatively small sample size in the Euroba-
rometer might influence the robustness of these
findings.
The comparison between desired and realized fertil-
ity is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the
comparison of the TFR with the measures on de-
sired fertility might exaggerate the width of the gap
since TFR is subjected to tempo-distortions and
measures on desired fertility often refer to cohort
ideals (Sobotka & Lutz 2010). Secondly, the infor-
mation on preferences is collected in surveys and
the respondents’ answers might not, depending,
e. g., on how the question is asked or what the pre-
vailing stereotypes are, reflect respondents’ true
preferences (Testa & Grilli 2006). Thirdly, fertility
preferences tend to change over the life course (for
western Germany, see Heiland et al. 2008; for dif-
ferences between eastern and western Germany, see
Buhr & Kuhnt 2012).
4 Economic explanations
According to economic theory, a household’s de-
mand for children depends on its tastes concerning
the quantity and quality of children and, given
these preferences, the number of children is deter-
mined by the extent to which the household can af-
ford to have them (Becker 1960; Becker & Lewis
1993; Willis 1973; for a review, see Robinson
1997). The influence of female income can be either
positive or negative, depending on whether the in-
come or substitution effect (due to the increases in
the opportunity costs) is dominant. The theory thus
leads us to consider particularly the influence of in-
come and education on fertility but can also be ex-
tended to other variables, such as unemployment
(Özcan et al. 2010).
4.1 Empirical evidence
Findings from empirical studies are mixed. As to
family income (for second births in Sweden, see
Dribe & Stanfors 2010) and father’s education (for
second births in Spain, see Brodmann et al. 2007;
for second and third births in Norway and Sweden,
see Duvander et al. 2010; for fertility intentions in
Italy and the Netherlands, see Mills et al. 2008),
several studies have found a positive effect on fertil-
ity in accordance with the theoretical expectations.
Moreover, different transfers to families have a pos-
itive effect on fertility both at macro (for family al-
lowances in 22 industrialized countries, see Gauth-
ier & Hatzius 1997; for tax benefits in the USA see
Ridao-Cano & McNown 2005; for the level of
family benefits in Switzerland, see Bonoli 2008)
and micro-levels (for family allowances in Israel,
see Schellekens 2009; for child deductions and tax
credits in Spain, see Azmat & Gonzlez 2010; for
baby bonus in Australia, see Drago et al. 2011),
which likewise supports the theory. Yet, some stud-
ies show that family income is negatively related to
fertility (for the USA see Westoff & Marshall 2010;
for third and fourth births in Sweden, see Dribe &
Stanfors 2010), and in some studies the income or/
and education of the father is not found to have any
significant effect on childbearing (for second births
in Sweden and Hungary, see Olh 2003; for second
births in Denmark, see Brodmann et al. 2007).
As to the female income and education, three differ-
ent types of relationship are found. Firstly, several
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Table 3 Mean personal ideal family size in Germany in
2001 and 2006
Cohorts 1962–76 Age 25–39
2001 2006 2001 2006
Germany 1.73 2.13 1.73 2.11
Germany East 1.74 2.23 1.74 2.08
Germany West 1.73 2.12 1.73 2.12
Source: Table 2 in Testa (2007: 362).
4 A comparison with older studies (e. g. Freedman et al.
1959) shows that the desired fertility has declined over
years.
studies support the substitution effect. For example,
the association between female income and fertility
(for first to third births in Norway, see Rønsen
2004; for first to third births in Italy, see Rondinelli
et al. 2010), as well as between educational attain-
ment and first births (for Germany, see Kreyenfeld
2004 and Klein & Eckhard 2007; for Netherlands,
see Keizer et al. 2007) is found to be negative, and
the relation between unemployment and childbear-
ing is often found to be positive (for first births in
Norway, see Kravdal 2002; for third births in Fin-
land, see Vikat 2004). Moreover, unemployment is
found to speed up the entry into motherhood (for
the Netherlands and Flanders, see Liefbroer & Cor-
ijn 1999; for first births in Germany among women
without education, see Kreyenfeld 2010).
Secondly, a large number of studies suggest that in-
come effects dominate. Female income is found to
be positively related to fertility in several Nordic
studies (for first births in Sweden, see Hoem 2000;
for first and second births in Sweden, see Anders-
son 2000; for first and third births in Finland, see
Vikat 2004). A possible explanation for these find-
ings is the policy context: As the compensation of
parenting leaves is calculated as a percentage of in-
come, women would seek to establish a good posi-
tion in the labor market before giving birth (Anders-
son 2000). Another factor in support of the income
effect is the negative influence of unemployment on
fertility (for higher order births in Norway, see
Kravdal 2002), and at first glance even the positive
effect of education at higher parities appears to
confirm the income effect (Hoem & Hoem 1989;
Berinde 1999; Olh 2003; Short & Torr 2004; Ger-
ster et al. 2007; Breton & Prioux 2009). However,
Kreyenfeld (2002) provides three alternative ex-
planations to the positive influence of education:
(1) That highly educated women postpone their
births (for the Netherlands and Flanders, see Lief-
broer & Corijn 1999; for France, see Meron et al.
2002; for Norway, see Lappegrd & Rønsen 2005;
for European countries, see Nicoletti & Tanturri
2008), and when they finally decide to have chil-
dren, they are approaching the biological limits of
their fertility and want to squeeze the births closer
to each other. This time-squeeze hypothesis does
not get much support from the investigations, how-
ever (for second births in West Germany, see
Kreyenfeld 2002; for second births in Denmark, see
Gerster et al. 2007). (2) Kreyenfeld’s second sugges-
tion is that highly educated women who already
have one child are a select group with stronger pref-
erences for children, and the hypothesis is sup-
ported to some extent (Kravdal 2001; Kreyenfeld
2002). (3) The most convincing hypothesis is on the
partner effect: Women and men with the same edu-
cational levels tend to partner, and the seemingly
positive relationship between women’s education is
explained by the income and education of her part-
ner (for third births in Austria, see Hoem et al.
2001; Kreyenfeld 2002; for second births in Aus-
tria, see Prskawetz & Zagaglia 2005; for second
births in West Germany, see Kçppen 2006).
Thirdly, in addition to the studies in support of in-
come and substitution effects, some studies offer
yet another picture. For example, the influence of
female income on second births in the UK is U-
shaped (Kreyenfeld & Zabel 2005), and unem-
ployed women in Finland do not differ from em-
ployed women in their propensity to have the sec-
ond child (Vikat 2004).
Finally, an increasing number of studies underline
the importance of discussing both the horizontal
and vertical aspects of education: Hoem et al.
(2006a, 2006b) find that Swedish women with edu-
cation in teaching and health care occupations ex-
perience in general lower levels of childlessness and
higher fertility than other women. Higher educa-
tion within any educational field, however, has a
negative effect on fertility (Lappegrd & Rønsen
2005; Van Bavel 2010). Hoem et al. (2006a: 334ff.)
suggest that educational field is important for sev-
eral reasons which are not related to income and
cannot thus be integrated into the economic theory.
For example, the level of job security, skill deprecia-
tion, gender dominance on the job as well as the na-
ture of job content and job prospects vary between
different occupational fields.
All in all, as predicted by the theory, income and
education clearly matter, but the way and the ex-
tent to which they matter seems to depend on other
factors. Thus, to derive the full benefit from the
theory it needs to be carefully considered how ex-
actly the contextual factors matter, and more atten-
tion needs to be paid not only on the direction of
the impact, but also on how effect size varies be-
tween countries with different institutional envi-
ronments (for further discussion, see section 8.1).
4.2 Economic factors and low fertility in Germany
As to the fertility decline and cross-country differ-
ences, even though both household wealth and
costs for children have increased over time and
vary between countries, it is difficult to draw strong
conclusions given the hypothesized quantity-quality
tradeoff. In addition, studies are faced with data
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availability problems considering the number of
variables that need to be included in order to cap-
ture all the necessary aspects. According to Diprete
et al. (2003) there is some indication that the costs
of children, and particularly the costs for the first
child, are relatively high in West Germany in com-
parison to a number of other countries. However,
such differences can be related to the variation in
the institutional context, which is better addressed
by the role compatibility theories (section 6). On
the other hand, the increase in the TFR in East Ger-
many in the 1970s could be attributed to economic
factors: The pro-natalist policies which were intro-
duced in the 1970s included several allowances and
loans which improved the financial situation of
families and increased the compatibility between
work and family. Yet even though the family poli-
cies were expanded during the 1980s (Kreyenfeld
2004), the fertility decreased, which casts doubt on
such explanations.
As to the gap between desired and realized fertility,
a study conducted already in 1958 on desired fertil-
ity of married West German men and women
shows that the gap between desired and realized
fertility was largest for women with the highest ed-
ucation (Freedman et al. 1959). Moreover, the evi-
dence on the influence of economic factors, even
though mixed, indicates that economic explana-
tions might be important for the decisions not to
have the originally desired number of children.
Nevertheless, even though economic factors matter,
it is not clear why they matter. To take a German
example, two different groups of childless women
can be distinguished: Women in the first group do
not marry, work full-time and have a high level of
education, whereas women in the second group
likewise do not marry and work full-time but have
a low income (Dorbritz & Schwarz 1996). The im-
portance of education is further highlighted by the
high level of childlessness among academics: As
many as 31 percent of western German academics
(and 12% of eastern German academics) in cohorts
1959–1968 were childless at age of 40–49 (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt 2009: 28). However, it is not
certain if the influence of education is related to the
change in values (highly educated are said to be the
forerunners of the change in values), role compati-
bility (might be bigger for women with high educa-
tion) or women’s wages.
5 Second transition, fertility, and change in
values
The fertility decline occurred simultaneously with
other changes in family formation such as increases
in age at first marriage, cohabitation, extra-marital
births, and crude divorce rates (Sobotka & Toule-
mon 2008). Thus, it is important to ask if and how
these developments influence fertility, and whether
fertility and the other changes in family formation
can be explained with similar factors. However, the
literature on the determinants of union formation
and dissolution and on the association between co-
habitation, marriage, and divorce is too vast to be
discussed here. Below only studies which deal with
the effect of marital status or values on fertility are
discussed.
5.1 Marital status and fertility
Most studies find that being married increases fer-
tility in comparison to cohabitation, living apart or
being single (for second births in Sweden, see
Hoem & Hoem 1989; for first and second births in
Western Germany, see Hank 2003; for second
births in Denmark, see Gerster et al. 2007; for sec-
ond births in Finland and Norway, see Rønsen
2004; for second births in Australia, see Parr 2007;
for second births in Austria, see Prskawetz & Zaga-
glia 2005; for first births in Germany, see Schrçder
& Brüderl 2008). Some of these studies also differ-
entiate between cohabiting women and women
who live alone and find that cohabiting women
have higher fertility. However, it is difficult to draw
firm conclusions, as there is considerable variation
between countries (and couples) concerning the
reasons to cohabit; cohabitation can be understood
as pre-marriage, trial marriage, alternative to mar-
riage, or marriage-like practice (Sobotka & Toule-
mon 2008: 102). It is also important to bear in
mind that cross-country differerences are not
merely compositional effects. For example, cohabi-
tation is relatively common in the Nordic countries
and less common in the Mediterranean countries.
Due to the increase in the number of divorces,
childbearing in second and higher order unions has
become more common. Three mechanisms are sug-
gested to explain the relationship between repart-
nering and fertility: preferences for confirmation of
adulthood (the desire to become parent), union
commitment and siblings for the already existing
children (Griffith et al. 1985). Studies find support
particularly in favor of union commitment, that is,
the desire to have a first common child is strong in
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stepfamilies (for Sweden, see Vikat et al. 1999; for
Austria, see Buber & Prskawetz 2000; for Euro-
pean countries, see Thomson 2004). These results
might partly be due to differences in the timing of
births, however. A comparison between stepfami-
lies and conventional families in East and West Ger-
many shows that at shorter durations, couples in
stepfamilies are more likely to have another child,
but at longer durations the differences between the
two family types get smaller (Henz 2002).
5.2 Value change and fertility
Building on the classics such as Maslow’s (1943)
hierarchy of personal needs, Inglehart’s (1971) ob-
servations on changes in generational value orienta-
tions and Aries’ (1980) discussion on the relation-
ship between values and fertility, authors of the
second demographic transition theory argue that
the transition is driven by values (van de Kaa 1987,
2001, 2002; Lesthaeghe & Surkyn 1988; Lest-
haeghe & Neels 2002; Surkyn & Lesthaeghe
2004). According to this argument, at the micro-
level the fulfillment of lower order needs means
that individuals are motivated to pursue higher or-
der needs such as self-actualization and individuali-
zation. Individuals who have adopted the new post-
materialist mind set are claimed to be, for example,
more likely to cohabit prior to or even instead of
marriage. The association between values and
childbearing is not as clear. On the one hand, it is
possible that people decide against children to be
able to realize aspirations which have arisen from
the desire to self-actualization. On the other hand,
it is also possible that people still have children, but
for different reasons. For example, children might
be considered as a part of self-actualization (Aries
1980). At the macro-level, the most advanced coun-
tries in terms of value change should also be the
most advanced countries in terms of the second
demographic transition (van de Kaa 2001: 302).
At this level, the value-change argument runs into
trouble at least for two reasons (cf. McDonald
2002: 426–428). Firstly, change in values appears
to go hand in hand with some family formation var-
iables while the relation to fertility is questionable.
For example, it is true that the correlation between
postmaterialism and mean age at first marriage, co-
habitation, and total divorce rate is positive, and
the correlation between postmaterialism and total
first marriage rate negative (van de Kaa 2001).
Likewise, descriptive evidence shows that a correla-
tion between values and the timing of the first birth
postponement as well as its initial pace can be
found. However, contrary to expectations the con-
ventional TFR, adjTFR, and mean intended family
size are positively correlated with progressive values
(Sobotka 2008b, 2008c). Secondly, as the causality
from value change to lower fertility is suggested to
run through preferences we would, based on the
theory, expect fertility preferences to be relatively
similar to the observed fertility. Yet, as already dis-
cussed above, subreplacement fertility ideals have
so far been observed only in very few countries.
At the micro-level, the evidence in support of the
theory is more convincing, even though some of the
results are open to alternative interpretations. For
example, the average number of children for
women aged 30–34 in most developed countries is
higher for materialists than for postmaterialists
(van de Kaa 2001: 320). Furthermore, the lower
fertility of the highly educated women supports the
value effect, as highly educated women are assumed
to be the forerunners of the value change. High reli-
giosity and fertility are often correlated (for fertility
ideals and intentions in European countries, see
Philipov & Berghammer 2007; for transition to
first births in West Germany, see Kreyenfeld 2004;
for second births in Austria, see Prskawetz & Zaga-
glia 2005; for university educated women in Aus-
tralia, see Newman & Hugo 2006; for Europe and
the USA, see Frejka & Westoff 2008; for the USA,
see Westoff & Marshall 2010), which supports the
assumption that values indeed influence fertility.
However, there are even denominational differen-
ces in fertility (for higher fertility of the Muslim
women in Europe, see Westoff & Frejka’s 2007; for
higher fertility of the Protestants and Catholics in
comparison of the people with no affiliation in the
US and Europe, see Frejka & Westoff 2008) and
fertility ideals (for Catholics and conservative Prot-
estants in comparison with mainline Protestants
and people without religious affiliation in 13 devel-
oped countries, see Adsera 2006). Even though it is
possible that individuals belonging to certain de-
nominations are more religious than others, it is
also possible that other aspects of religion such as
norms within the religious groups influence fertility
(McQuillan 2004). Moreover, given that parental
religiosity is found to influence fertility (for the pos-
itive influence of religious socialization on fertility
in Spain, see Branas-Garza & Neuman 2006; and
for third births in the Netherlands, see Berghammer
2009), socialization appears to be an important as-
pect in explaining current behavior. Indeed, more
investigations on the role of parental home are
needed, particularly given that there also is evi-
dence about the intergenerational transmission of
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childbearing: Women who have several siblings
tend to have larger families or a higher probability
to proceed to higher parities than women from
smaller families (for Poland, Italy and Norway, see
Murphy & Wang 2001; for West Germany, see
Kreyenfeld 2004), and parents’ age at childbirth in-
fluences their children’s decisions concerning the
timing of the births (for teenage births in the USA,
see Furstenberg et al. 1990; for first births in the
Netherlands, see Steenhof & Liefbroer 2008).
To sum up, the facts that simultaneous changes in
values and family formation can be observed and
that fertility preferences have declined over time
suggest that values and fertility are associated in
one way or another. Even though the macro-level
evidence is mixed, it is for instance possible that
values influence life style preferences, or preferen-
ces for the number of children, which would ex-
plain some of the micro-level findings.
5.3 Value change and low fertility in Germany
Change in values does not help us to understand
why fertility increased in East Germany in the
1970s, and then suddenly declined again. The
theory also does not explain the gap between the
desired and realized fertility or, given that also the
reasons for wanting children may have changed ac-
cording to the theory, the cross-country differences
in fertility. As to Germany in particular, the above
cited study by van de Kaa (2001) shows that in
post-modern values western scores higher than
eastern Germany. Sobotka’s (2008b) study shows
that as to the second demographic transition re-
lated values, Germany scores relatively high, but
the Nordic countries with higher fertility have even
higher scores. In other words, the relative ranking
of countries concerning values does not correspond
to the theoretical expectations. Naturally, more de-
tailed studies on the distribution of values among
the population might clarify these findings. For ex-
ample, it is possible that a larger share of people in
western Germany has more traditional values than
in eastern Germany, which in turn would explain
the differences in family size.
Finally, Klein (2003) shows that for western Ger-
man women in the cohort 1950–1959, the proba-
bility of a second child is highest for women in sta-
ble partnerships whereas the probability of having
a third or fourth child is higher for women who
have re-partnered. Further, there are no larger dif-
ferences in the propensity to have a first child be-
tween the cohorts born in 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and
1960s once the partnership is controlled for. Fi-
nally, partnership stability increases the propensity
of second births, but re-partnering in turn increases
the risk of having a third or fourth child. It is possi-
ble to interpret Klein’s findings (and other similar
findings) in the light of the value change theory and
claim that the change in values has increased the
union dissolution and re-partnering and that a
value shift likewise explains why the unions of the
younger cohorts are less stable.
6 The role of family policy
The argument about the decisive role of family pol-
icy for fertility was inspired by the observation that
the association between female labor force partici-
pation (FLFP) and TFR has been positive since the
mid-1980s (Ahn &Mira 2000; Castles 2003; Rind-
fuss et al. 2003). Esping-Andersen (1999) discusses
the degrees of de-familialization and familialism as
determinants for fertility and FLFP, others talk
about the incompatibility between worker and
mother roles (Rindfuss & Brewster 1996; Brewster
& Rindfuss 2000; Rindfuss et al. 2003), or the de-
gree of gender equity in different institutions
(McDonald 2000a, 2000b, 2002). The key argu-
ment is that fertility decline is explained with wom-
en’s entry to higher education and employment
whereas differences in family policies explain the
current cross-country differences in fertility. That
is, when family policy creates favorable circumstan-
ces for the combination of work and family, fertility
rates are higher, but when family policies discour-
age a mother’s work or make the combination of
work and motherhood difficult, women often
choose to have fewer children or stay childless.
There is widespread circumstantial evidence for the
influence of family policy on fertility. For example,
the decline in fertility took place simultaneously
with increases in female employment. Further, the
gap between preferred and realized fertility indi-
cates that the reasons for low fertility lie on con-
straints5 such as family policy. Indeed, several com-
mentators are convinced of the positive influence of
family policy on fertility (e. g. Bujard 2010; Rønsen
& Skrede 2010; Olh 2011). Critical reviews point
200 Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 43, Heft 3, Juni 2014, S. 192–211
5 The explanation can naturally be made even more sim-
ple; it is also possible that two persons with different pref-
erences partner (Voas 2003). Indeed, when spouses have
different fertility desires it has a negative effect on fertility
intentions and consequently on the number of births
(Thomson 1997).
out the lack of robust empirical evidence (Gauthier
2007) and emphasize the way in which family poli-
cies always interact with other policies and circum-
stances (Neyer 2011).
6.1 Macro-level evidence
To start with a description of the relationship be-
tween family policy, TFR, and FLFP (Table 4), both
the TFR and FLFP are relatively high in the Nordic
countries where the family policies support work-
ing parents but low in Japan, Korea and Mediterra-
nean countries (with the exception of Portugal)
where assistance to families is limited. However,
the correlation between family policies, TFR, and
FLFP is not as good in other cases. In eastern Euro-
pean countries where the degree of role compatibil-
ity is low (long leaves but low cash benefits and
child care supply for children under the age of
three) the TFR is low, but the FLFP is in most cases
above the OECD-average. Further, in Anglo-Saxon
countries and Switzerland the degree of role com-
patibility is likewise low (short leaves and targeted
support for low-income single parent families and
families with preschool children). Yet the TFRs are
high, except for Canada and Switzerland. For the
FLFP there is no clear pattern. Finally, in countries
where the financial support is high but support to
dual-earner families with children under age three
is limited, the level of the TFR varies considerably.
In all these countries the FLFP is higher than the
OECD-average, but the fertility rates are low in
Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg, whereas in
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands fertility rates
are above OECD-average.
In a time-series analysis the relationship between
the TFR and FLFP is still negative (Engelhardt et al.
2004). The positive correlation can be explained by
country effects and a variety in the magnitude of
the negative correlations. However, for some coun-
tries the negative correlation has become weaker
over the years, which could be interpreted as confir-
matory evidence to the role compatibility theories
(Kçgel 2004).
Macro-level studies on the influence of family pol-
icy on fertility are scarce. In line with the theoreti-
cal argument, the level of fertility in Switzerland is
positively influenced by day care availability (Bo-
noli 2008). Contrary to the argument, in their study
on 22 countries between 1970 and 1990, Gauthier
& Hatzius (1997) find that neither the duration of
nor the compensation for maternity leave has any
influence on fertility. All in all, the most robust
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Table 4 Family policy regimes according to Thvenon
(2011), TFR and FLFP (for women aged 25–54) in 2010
TFR FLFP
Continuous, strong support for working parents of
children under age 3
Denmark 1.88 85.3
Finland 1.87 84.4
Iceland 2.20 85.3
Norway 1.95 84.4
Sweden 1.98 86.6
High financial support, but limited support to dual-earner
families with children under age 3
Austria 1.44 82.8
Belgium 1.87 80.4
France 2.02 83.7
Germany 1.39 81.3
Luxembourg 1.63 76.4
Netherlands 1.80 82.3
Short leave, support targeted on low-income single-
parent families and families with preschool children
Australia 1.89 75.2
Canada 1.63 82.3
Ireland 2.07 71.9
New Zealand 2.15 76.9
Switzerland 1.54 83.5
UK 1.98 78.7
USA 1.93 75.2
Long leave but low cash benefits and childcare for
children under age 3
Czech Republic 1.49 79.8
Hungary 1.26 74.6
Poland 1.38 78.6
Slovakia 1.40 80.8
Limited assistance to families
Greece 1.51 72.2
Italy 1.41 64.4
Korea 1.23 62.2
Japan 1.39 71.6
Portugal 1.37 84.9
Spain 1.38 78.3
Average 1.62 76.0
Sources: Thvenon (2011) For the classification of countries,
OECD (2012) for TFR and FLFP.
finding of the influence of family policies on fertil-
ity is the Swedish “speed premium”: When the
mother gives birth to her next child within a certain
period from her last birth, the amount of the paren-
tal leave compensation can still be calculated from
the wage prior to the first childbirth, and not from
the income between the births. This kind of pre-
mium has found to speed up the pace between hav-
ing children (Andersson et al. 2006).
Finally, the positive relationship between TFR and
FLFP is not automatically an indication of the influ-
ence of family policies. Several scholars have for ex-
ample suggested that unemployment statistics ex-
plain the positive relationship between the two
variables (Engelhardt & Prskawetz 2004; Da Ro-
cha & Fuster 2006). According to Adsera (2004),
the level and persistence of unemployment, among
other things, indicates the flexibility of labor mar-
kets; when women are able to enter to and exit
from the labor market without greater difficulties,
and when the negative consequences of short-time
exits from the labor market are not too high, the
fertility rate is high.
6.2 Micro-level evidence
In comparison to women who are active in the la-
bor market, inactive women have higher fertility
and higher propensity to progress to higher parities
across countries (for births at parities 0–4+ in the
USA, see Blau & Robins 1989; for second and third
births in Sweden, see Hoem & Hoem 1989; for sec-
ond births in Germany, see Cooke 2004; for first
births in Germany, see Kreyenfeld 2004; for second
births in Austria, see Prskawetz & Zagaglia 2005,
for second births in Italy and Spain, see Cooke
2008; for France, see Breton & Prioux 2009).
Given that family policy creates different kinds of
incentive structures for inactive women it is likely
that the effect size varies between countries and
over time, and future research should address not
only the direction of the effect but also its size. The
study by Schrçder & Brüderl (2008) on West Ger-
many neatly illustrates why the concentration on
effect sizes is important. The authors suggest that
the positive effect of inactivity on fertility is at least
partly not causal, as the negative effect of employ-
ment on first birth propensity has increased over
cohorts – a result which Schrçder & Brüderl inter-
pret as evidence for increasing self-selection of fam-
ily oriented women into inactivity.
Even though part-time work is more compatible
with childbearing than full-time work, studies
mainly from the Northern European countries find
that the propensity of childbearing does not vary
between part-time and full-time working women
(for second and third births in Sweden, see Hoem
& Hoem 1989; for second births in Sweden, see
Olh 2003; for second births in Denmark, see
Brodmann et al. 2007; for first births in Germany,
see Schrçder & Brüderl 2008). In countries where
family policies are geared more towards the male
breadwinner families, part-time working women
have a higher propensity to have children (for the
Netherlands and Flanders, see Liefbroer & Corijn
1999; for second births in western Germany and
Great Britain, see Kreyenfeld & Zabel 2005). A
possible explanation is that Nordic family policies
allow women to combine work and family both by
working part-time and full-time, whereas in coun-
tries where policies which help women to combine
work and family are limited, part-time working
women are a selected group of more family-ori-
ented women.
As to the influence of family policies, several stud-
ies conclude that the availability of child care (see
Kravdal 1996 for third births in Norway; Del Boca
2002 for childbearing in Italy; Olh 2003 for the
intensity of second births in Sweden; Rindfuss et al.
2007 for first birth timing in Norway; Baizn 2009
for first and higher order births in Spain; Rindfuss
et al. 2010 for the level of fertility in Norway), as
well as parental or care leave extensions, or in-
creases in the compensation for those leaves have a
positive influence on fertility (for timing of the
third births in Austria, see Hoem et al. 2001; for
timing of the second and third births in Norway,
see Aassve & Lappegrd 2009; for positive effect
on both tempo and quantum in Austria, see Lalive
& Zweimüller 2009; for western European coun-
tries, see Kalwij 2010). Nevertheless, some studies
find a negative influence of child care availability
(see Rønsen 2004 for first, second and third births
in Norway and Finland), and Vikat (2004) finds
that the extension of the home care leave in Finland
has had a positive influence on third but not on sec-
ond births. These results indicate that the influence
of family policy on fertility is not as straightfor-
ward as suggested by the theory. For example, Blau
& Robinson (1989) show that high child care costs
in the USA reduce the fertility of inactive, but not
of employed women, which indicates that the influ-
ence of family policy is conditional on women’s la-
bor market status or education.
The results from studies on domestic division of
care and household work support the conclusion
that family policies influence different types of fam-
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ilies differently. Several studies find that a more
equal division of household work or fathers’ at-
tendance to childrearing (for second births in the
USA, see Torr & Short 2004; for second births in
Germany, see Cooke 2004; for second births in
Denmark, see Brodmann et al. 2007; for second
births in Spain and Italy, see Cooke 2008; for fertil-
ity intentions in Italy and the Netherlands, see
Mills et al. 2008) as well as fathers’ take of paren-
tal leave (for second births in Sweden and Hun-
gary, see Olh 2003; for second and third births in
Sweden, see Duvander & Andersson 2006; for sec-
ond and third births in Norway and Sweden, see
Duvander et al. 2010) have a positive effect on
childbearing. Many of these studies also show that
in families in which mothers take responsibility
for the bulk of household/care work, fertility is
higher. Thus, future studies on the influence of
family policy on fertility should take a closer look
on how these policies influence the different sub-
groups of women.
6.3 Family policy and low fertility in Germany
The increase in fertility in East Germany in the
1970s when the policies which improved the role
compatibility were implemented, as well as the suc-
cessive convergence in the levels of fertility between
eastern and western parts after the reunification
point towards the influence of family policies. As to
the cross-country differences, it is reasonable to as-
sume that low fertility in Germany in comparison
to for example Northern European countries can
be at least partly explained by differences in the de-
gree of defamilialization. Further, the higher total
fertility and lower childlessness in East Germany
can be seen as consequences of differences in family
policies; West Germany was a typical conservative
welfare regime, whereas the family policies in East
Germany promoted women’s full-time employment
(Ostner 1994; Kreyenfeld 2004). The importance
of context is further illustrated by differences in the
influence of education on fertility: It is often as-
sumed that particularly highly educated women ex-
perience problems with role compatibility and con-
sequently, the high degree of role incompatibility in
Germany is often blamed for the high childlessness
among the German academics (e. g. Bujard 2012).
However, in Finland and Sweden the highly edu-
cated women in cohorts 1955–1959 actually have
lower level of childlessness than women with low
education (Andersson et al. 2009). Likewise,
Kreyenfeld’s (2004) study shows that educational
differences in childlessness were minimal in East
Germany whereas higher education in West Ger-
many also predicted higher risk of childlessness.
Several studies at the micro-level support these con-
siderations, and deviant findings can often be ex-
plained in a way that fits the theoretical argument.
For instance, Hank et al. (2004) find that only in
eastern parts of Germany does the availability of
child care have a positive statistically significant in-
fluence on the propensity to have a first child,
whereas in the western parts of the country the in-
formal care availability has a positive effect. Fur-
ther, Hank & Kreyenfeld (2003) find a positive but
statistically insignificant effect of child care avail-
ability on first births in western Germany and a
strong positive statistically significant effect of the
availability of informal care. Both studies suggest
that the current supply of child care is not sufficient
to enable the mothers to combine work and family,
which also means that women ignore the role of in-
stitutional child care in their decision-making about
their first child (for similar results concerning the
influence of formal day care on desired fertility, see
Ette & Ruckdeschel 2007).
On the other hand, the correlation between family
policy, female employment and fertility is not per-
fect, and the empirical evidence is far from water-
tight. For example, the increase in fertility in East
Germany during the 1970s was short-lived, and a
comparison between Germany and the Anglo-
Saxon countries shows that generous family poli-
cies are not the only road to high fertility. Notice
also that even though childlessness was lower in
East Germany, in West Germany the policies which
promoted male breadwinner families might explain
the relatively large share of women who decided to
have three or more children. Finally, the child gap
(the difference between desired and realized fertil-
ity) can be observed in basically all developed coun-
tries, which shows that even high levels of defamili-
alization do not remove all constraints. In other
words, the causal mechanisms between family pol-
icy and fertility are not yet fully understood. To be
able to further the knowledge on the interplay be-
tween family policy and other variables it is advis-
able to pay more attention to how effects (with re-
spect to both their direction and size) of different
variables such as education, inactivity, and income
vary at different parities across countries and over
time.
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7 Women’s heterogeneous preferences
According to Hakim (1998, 2000, 2003), five his-
torical changes (contraceptive revolution, equal op-
portunities revolution, expansion of white-collar
jobs, creation of jobs for secondary earners, in-
crease in the importance of personal desires, and at-
titudes when it comes to life time choices) have
changed the opportunity structures for women and
made it possible for women to choose the kind of
life they want. Hakim further claims that women
can be divided into three different groups based on
their preferences and that women’s choices and re-
sponses to government policies can be traced back
to the differences in preferences. The reason for
low fertility thus is a bias in social policy towards
one particular group of women. A minority group
of women (10–30% of women) is home-centered,
with a desire for large families and homemaking.
Another minority group (10–30% of women) is
work-centered, with the primary interest of making
career and often even with the preference of not
having children. Finally, a majority of women are
adaptive (40–80% of women) and do not prioritize
employment or family but wish to combine these
two.
Hakim has often been critizised for ignoring the
role of constraints (Crompton & Harris 1998;
McRae 2003). The critics also point out that the
empirical evidence does not fully support the theory
(see below). An additional problem is that the
theory does not clarify the reason for heterogene-
ous preferences (Pfau-Effinger 2004).
7.1 Empirical evidence
An increasing number of investigations show that
women have heterogeneous life style preferences,
but that the correlation between preferences and
actual choices is not always that good (Vitali et al.
2009; Janus 2013; Salles et al. 2010). Moreover,
the studies which investigate the determinants of
women’s choices find that even though preferences
matter, constraints related, for example, to family
policy are important as well (Crompton & Lyonette
2005; Kangas & Rostgaard 2007).
So far studies have concentrated on exploring the
heterogeneity in preferences or the influence of
preferences on women’s labor market participation.
The effect of women’s heterogeneous lifestyle pref-
erences on fertility remains largely unexplored,
even though the theory has slowly started to draw
demographers’ attention. The few existing studies
indicate that heterogeneity of preferences is a po-
tentially fruitful area for future studies. Lee &
Gramotnev (2006) show that women’s preferences
for one to two children go hand in hand with pref-
erences for market employment, and preferences
for larger families are likewise correlated with pref-
erences for homemaking or part-time work. The
comparative study of European countries by Vitali
et al. (2009) in turn shows that even though prefer-
ences and fertility intentions do not match, there is
a strong correlation between employment-child-
bearing preferences and realized fertility behavior.
7.2 Preferences and low fertility in Germany
As already discussed above, the gap between de-
sired and realized fertility indicates that women are
not able to choose according to their preferences.
Consequently, preference theory alone does not
provide a full answer to low fertility. However, a
change in women’s preferences in terms of work
and family (say a shift from homemaking preferen-
ces to adaptive and work-centered preferences)
could help us understand the long term trends in
fertility. Unfortunately there are no studies which
explore women’s preferences in Germany over sev-
eral decades.
Further, differences in the share of women with dif-
ferent life style preferences could provide a partial
answer to the cross-country differences in fertility.
However, to explain the high share of childlessness
in Germany we would expect to find a larger share
of work-centered women in Germany than in, for
example, Sweden, and both Janus (2013) and Vitali
et al. (2009) show that in comparison to Sweden a
smaller share of German women are career-ori-
ented and a larger share home-centered. On the
other hand, estimates of the share of home-centered
and work-centered women in Sweden and Ger-
many vary between studies, which illustrates the
difficulty of drawing strong conclusions about
cross-country differences in women’s preferences
based on current research.
Those German studies which concentrate on the
differences between the eastern and western parts
of the country (Stçrtzbach 1993; Beckmann 2002;
Dorbritz 2004; Holst 2009) show that in the west-
ern parts of Germany a larger number of women
prefers inactivity when having children whereas in
the eastern parts full-time preferences are more
common. Moreover, some of the studies show that
full-time preferences go hand in hand with the pref-
erence for smaller families, whereas part-time pref-
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erences go together with preferences for a larger
number of children. Thus, these studies suggest that
the differences in preferences are a partial reason
for the higher fertility rates at higher birth orders
(3+) in western as well as for the higher fertility
rates at lower birth orders (1–2) in eastern Ger-
many (the usual problems with distinguishing the
direction of causality between preferences and be-
havior naturally remain).
8 Concluding remarks
Overall, this review demonstrates how different
theories are helpful for different purposes. Firstly,
increases in women’s employment as well as
changes in values provide a good explanation for
the fertility decline, but the East German fertility
increase in the 1970s is most appropriately ad-
dressed by theories which concentrate on the conse-
quences of family policy changes (improved eco-
nomic situation and role compatibility). Secondly,
the differences in fertility across countries, as well
as between eastern and western Germany both
when it comes to total and birth order specific fer-
tility are best understood in the light of theories
which emphasize the role of family policies. In ad-
dition, preference theory is fruitful when we want
to understand the differences between the two parts
of Germany. Thirdly, the economic explanations
and role compatibility theories provide the best ex-
planation to the gap between desired and realized
fertility.
On the other hand, even though much is already
known, the large variety of factors which are found
to influence fertility shows that none of the above
theories alone is fully able to provide a fully com-
prehensive explanation of low fertility. Thus, to be
able to provide a good explanation to low fertility
independently from how the dependent variable
looks like it is necessary to incorporate all findings
into a unifying framework. In path to such frame-
work at least three important issues need to be
dealt with.
8.1 The need for more emphasis on effect sizes
Some social scientists argue that it is crucial in ex-
planatory quantitative studies to concentrate on the
substantial effect of the independent variables in-
stead of focusing on the directional impact (Taage-
pera 2008; Ziliak & McCloskey 2008). The re-
search on low fertility would benefit from applying
this advice, particularly when it comes to investiga-
tions on the determinants of cross-country and
cross-cohort differences. As discussed briefly above
e. g. in relation to the positive effect of inactivity on
childbearing, it is simply not enough to study
whether a variable has a positive or negative influ-
ence on fertility, but it is crucial to estimate the size
of the effect as well and then compare the magni-
tude of the effect between countries and cohorts.
Such comparisons would for example give us valua-
ble information on if and how the influence of a
variable varies depending on country and cohort,
which in turn would help us to better understand
the influence of, e. g., family policy context on fer-
tility. Many researchers already discuss such issues,
but to get the most out of cross-country and cross-
cohort studies and to enable comparisons between
different studies, the practice of estimating the ef-
fect size of independent variables needs to become
standard.
8.2 The need for more research on women’s
preferences
Given that preferences are important for the
choices individuals make and that women’s work-
life choices are at the center of the low fertility puz-
zle, it is surprising that there still are so few studies
on women’s preferences concerning work and fam-
ily. Moreover, particularly the theories which em-
phasize the role of family policy for women’s
choices about children seem to assume that women
want to combine work and family and that wom-
en’s preferences are similar between countries and
cohorts. Yet, a look at the literature shows that
women have heterogeneous preferences which vary
between countries and that preferences at least
partly influence decision-making. This leads to the
conclusion that in future research it will be impor-
tant to study differences in preferences between
women in different countries and over cohorts, as
well as investigate the extent to which the observed
work-life behavior corresponds to lifestyle prefer-
ences. Furthermore, it is crucial to understand the
determinants of preferences, as it is possible that
some of the determinants of fertility (like value
change) have an indirect influence on childbearing
through joint preferences on work and family.
8.3 The need for more interdisciplinary research
Quantitative research often concentrates on the
simultaneous effects of the independent variables
on the dependent variable (by integrating the inde-
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pendent variables into a basic regression equation).
More attention should be given to the sequential in-
teraction between the variables, i. e. to the ways in
which the variables are related to each other (Taa-
gepera 2008). In my opinion, this is particularly
critical when it comes to low fertility and calls for
more cooperation between the different subfields of
social science. After all, different variables such as
family policy and education are interesting for de-
mographers mainly insofar as these variables influ-
ence childbearing. At the same time, in other disci-
plines the same variables are treated as dependent
variables with different interests in mind. Conse-
quently, it is likely that the research on fertility
would benefit from studies which build bridges be-
tween the knowledge gained in other fields of social
science. Findings from studies related to topics such
as determinants of religiosity (Stolz 2009) or of ed-
ucational choices (Hadjar & Berger 2013) might
give important insights concerning the ways in
which family and social background indirectly in-
fluence fertility.
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